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TED J. FIFLIS, Professor of Law, University of
Colorado School of Law, Boulder, Colorado
Speaking generally, § 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 (hereafter
the "Act"), 15 U.S.C. §77K
(1970), gives purchasers of regis-
tered securities a cause of action
against several participants in a
registered offering for an untrue
statement or omission of a material
fact in the final, effective registra-
tion statement.
A particular registered offering
may be subject as well to other
liability provisions, such as §10b-5
of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
The leading cases on § II have
been Escott v. Bar Chris Construc-
tion Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), and Feit v.
Leasco Data Processing Equip-
ment Corp.. 332 F. Supp. 544
(E.D.N.Y. 1971). Another case
(in two opinions) which presum-
ably will be of importance is
Beecher v. Able, [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 194,450 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
and [1974-1975 TransferBinder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,016
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
SCOPE
The incidence of § 11 was re-
cently extended as a result of the
adoption of Rule 145, which
repealed Rule 133, the "no-sale
rule," and made securities trans-
actions in certain previously ex-
empted reclassifications, mergers,
and purchases of assets for stock
subject to the registration require-
ments. Since adoption of Rule 145,
a registration statement will be
required in a statutory merger un-
less an exemption is available, and
misrepresentations or omissions in
the registration statement will be
subject to §11 exposure. However,
on a purchase of assets for securi-
ties, Rule 145(3) requires is-
36 THE PRACTICAL LAWYER (Vol. 21--No. 7)
tration only if the transfer of assets
is part of a pre-existing plan for
distribution of the securities, or
the asset seller is dissolved or dis-
tributes the securities received or
adopts resolutions for dissolution
or distribution within a year of the
vote of its shareholders on the
asset sale.
Section II therefore relates to
all the various types of registered
offerings-direct offerings by issu-
ers, including corporate combina-
tions, reorganizations, and share
for share exchanges, and registered
secondary offerings by persons in
a control relationship with the
issuer, including a parent corpora-
tion's use of its subsidiary's securi-
ties in a corporate combination,
and vice versa.
Non-registered primary or sec-
ondary offerings, including "Reg.
A" offerings, are not covered by
§ 11 but may be subject to other
liability provisions of the securities
acts.
Even if accompanied by a pros-
pectus, oral misrepresentations are
not covered by §11, although an
action may be available under
§12(2) or §17(a) of the 1933
Act, Rule 1Ob-5 promulgated un-
der the 1934 Act, and, in certain
circumstances, §§9, 14, and 15
under the 1934 Act.
PURPOSES
The general assumption is that
§11 liability is not punitive in na-
ture, though its exclusive purpose
does not seem to be to make the
investor whole. Rather, it appears
to be aimed at effectuating the two
expressed policies stated in the
preamble to the Act: "To provide
full and fair disclosure of the char-
acter of securities sold in interstate
and foreign commerce and through
the mails, and to prevent frauds in
the sale thereof, and for other pur-
poses."
One other matter that may
throw light on § 11 is the fact that
the original version of the section,
enacted at the nadir of business
prestige in early 1933, was amend-
ed in 1934 as the result of a con-
certed campaign to weaken its pro-
visions. Numerous changes which
seem incompatible with the major
thrust of § 11 were adopted at that
time. Hence, these clauses are the
product of ultimate compromise






In case any part of the regis-
tration statement, when such part
became effective, contained an un-
true statement of a material fact
or omitted to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, any person
acquiring such security (unless it
is proved that at the time of such
36
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acquisition he knew of such un-
truth or omission) may, either at
law or in equity, in any court of
competent jurisdiction, sue . . .
(italics supplied).
Because the phrase, "such se-
curity," is an appositive without
a referent, the issue is posed
whether only persons who acquired
a security in the chain of title from
the registered offering-linear priv-
ity-may sue, or whether anyone
who acquired a security of the
same class as those registered may
also sue.
Barnes v. Osojsky, 373 F.2d
269 (2d Cir. 1967), and Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp.,
257 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), held that a plaintiff must
prove linear privity. See also Rud-
nick v. Franchard Corp., 237 F.
Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
where an underwriter in the first
of two registered offerings was not
liable to buyers in the second
offering. Hence if the registered
offering is of a class previously
outstanding, or if additional offer-
ings are made, a plaintiff may be
unable to recover if he cannot
sustain his burden of proving linear
privity.
The proposed American Law
Institute Federal Securities Code
(hereafter "ALI Code") §§1403
and 1409 (T.D. No. 2, 1973),
would permit recovery by all per-
sons purchasing subsequent to the
offering statement, the functional
equivalent of the prospectus, but it




and omissions actionable under
§11 are all contained in or omitted
from a single registration state-
ment, one important characteristic
facilitating class actions is estab-
lished. As a result, class suits are
common under the section and are
well suited. See H. BLOOMENTHAL,
SECURITIES AND FEDERAL COR-
PORATION LAW 8-98 (Clark Board-
man, New York, 1975).
Actions by Underwriters
Professor Loss has suggested
that an underwriter, being one who
"acquired" the securities in a regis-
tered offering, may himself have
an action under §11 although he
is also one of the class of defen-
dants. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REG-
ULATION 1723-24, n. 129 (Little
Brown, Boston, 2d ed. 1961).
(This set and the 1969 Supple-
ment, volumes 4, 5, and 6, will
hearafter be cited "Loss.") But he
recognizes the disruption that this
right to sue would cause in the
operation of §11(f), providing for
contribution among the defendants.
6 Loss at 3844.
Priorities on Insolvency
If the issuer is insolvent, there
may be claims against the insol-
37
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vent estate both by equity security
purchasers suing under §11 and
other non-equity creditors, sug-
gesting a question whether the §11
equity holding plaintiffs should
share on a par with other creditors
or should be subordinated. This
problem arises with other pro-
visions of the securities acts as
well. See Slain & Kripke, The
Interlace Between Securities Regu-
lation and Bankruptcy-Allocating
the Risk of Illegal Securities Issu-
ance Between Security Holders
and the Issuer's Creditors, 48
N.Y.U. L. REV. 261 (1973).
The uniform answer so far has
been that securities act claimants
are creditors regardless of whether
their claims derive from some
equity security, and will share on
a par with other unsecured credi-
tors on insolvency. Four Seasons
Nursing Centers of America, Inc.,
472 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1973);
In Re Los Angeles Land & Invest-
ments, Ltd., 282 F. Supp. 448
(D. Hawaii 1968); SEC v. Insur-
ance Investors Trust Co., [ 1971-72
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 93,259 (W.D. Ky.
1971); Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F.
Supp. 1099 (S.D. Tex. 1970),
petition for writ of mandamus de-
nied in part and granted in part
sub. nom. Ernst & Ernst v. U.S.
Dist. Ct., 457 F.2d 1399 (5th Cir.
1972). Cf. Oppenheimer v. Harri-
man Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 301
U.S. 206 (1937).
The rule has been criticized by
Slain & Kripke, supra, who recom-
mend subordination where an
equity holder claims rescission.
The proposed Bankruptcy Act of
1973 §4-406, H.R. Doc. No.
93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), introduced as H.R. 10792
and S.2565, would subordinate
not only rescission claimants but
even those whose claims are based
on a tort by non-selling defendants.
The ALI Code §1602(d), T.D.
No. 3 (1974), will follow what-
ever provisions the Bankruptcy Act
contains.
DEFENDANTS
Section I1 also presents some
difficult problems of interpretation
as to who are proper defendants,
although it seems to identify very
specifically several categories. The
questions arise in determining who
belongs in each category.
Section 11(a) lists as possible
defendants:
* Signers of the registration state-
ment;
0 Directors, partners, or near di-
rectors and partners of the issuer;
* Experts who are named as hav-
ing prepared or certified a part of
the registration statement; and
0 Underwriters of the security.
Signers
Section 6(a) of the Act, 15
38
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U.S.C. §77f(a), specifies those
who are required to sign a regis-
tration statement:
[E] ach issuer, its principal exec-
utive officer or officers, its principal
financial officer, its comptroller or
principal accounting officer, and
the majority of its board of direc-
tors or persons performing similar
functions (or if there is no board
of directors or persons performing
similar functions, by the majority
of the persons or board having the
power of management of the is-
suer), and in case the issuer is a
foreign or territorial person" by its
duly authorized representative in
the United States.
Since §11(a) seems to be un-
ambiguous in holding every person
who "signed," any ambiguities of
§6(a) presumably will have been
resolved at the time of filing the
registration statement. Those who
signed will be liable, but not those
who did not. But see Douglas &
Bates, The Federal Securities Act
of 1933, 43 YALE L. J. 171, 194
(1933).
Directors and Near Directors
§11(a)(2) and (3) add to the
list of possible defendants:
(2) [E]very person who was a
director of (or person performing
similar functions) or partner in
the issuer at the time of the filing
of the part of the registration
statement with respect to which
his liability is asserted.
(3) [E]very person who, with
his consent, is named in the regis-
tration statement as being or about
to become a director, person per-
forming similar functions, or part-
ner.
Does a "person performing sim-
ilar functions" to those performed
by directors include a person who
controls dummy directors? The
dictum in Mersay v. First Republic
Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465,
469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), indicates so.
More likely, only persons who di-
rect non-corporate issuers, like
general partners, trustees, and as-
sociates, are covered. See 3 Loss
at 1724, n.130. The legislative his-
tory of § 15 of the Act, dealing
with vicarious liability, indicates
that it is that section that is aimed
specifically at the principal of a
dummy director. S. Rep. No. 47,
73d Cong. 1st Sess. 5 (1933);
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 152, 73d
Cong. 1st Sess. 27 (1933).
Experts
§ll(a)(4) makes liable:
[E]very accountant, engineer, or
appraiser, or any person whose
profession gives authority to a
statement made by him, who has
with his consent been named as
having prepared or certified any
report or valuation which is used
in connection with the registration
statement, with respect to the
statement in such registration
statement, report, or valuation,
39
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which purports to have been pre-
pared or certified by him.
Although ordinarily the phrase
"whose profession gives authority
to a statement made by him" might
be ambiguous, the practical ad-
ministration of the registration
process removes any doubt, since
the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (hereafter "Commission")
requires that manually signed con-
sents to be named an expert be
filed with it before the registration
statement will be made effective.
See 3 Loss 1740-41.
It would seem that, as with
"signers," one who signs a consent
will be considered an expert.
Unlike any of the other persons
liable under §11, experts are liable
only if the portion of the registra-
tion statement purporting to be
made on their authority is mis-
leading. §11(a)(4).
Underwriters
§11(a) concludes the list of
those liable with "every underwrit-
er with respect to such security."
Because the term "underwriter"
is a word of art, not only are the
managing and participating under-
writers held but so too are the
so-called "statutory underwriters"
as defined in §2(11), as well as
the "last moment underwriter"
under §11(d). SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5275 (June 26,
1972), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
ff4506B at pp. 4056-57; Folk,
Civil Liabilities Under the Federal
Securities Acts: The Bar Chris Case
(Part I1), 5 VA. L. REv. 199, 227-
34 (1969).
Statutory underwriters may in-
clude, for example, controlling
persons as well as lenders who take
shares from controlling persons as
pledges, although the term does
not include selling group brokers
unless they receive special treat-
ment from the underwriters.
Controlling Persons
In addition to the persons
named in §11(a), liability under
§11 may be imposed by §15 of the
Act on certain others. Section 15,
15 U.S.C. §770, reads:
Every person who, by or
through stock ownership, agency,
or otherwise, or who, pursuant to
or in conjunction with an agree-
ment or understanding with one or
more other persons by or through
stock ownership, agency, or other-
wise, controls any person liable
under sections 11 or 12, shall also
be liable jointly and severally with
and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to
whom such controlled person is
liable, unless the controlling per-
son had no knowledge of or rea-
sonable ground to believe in the
existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability of the controlled
person is alleged to exist.
Because the "unless" clause,
added by the 1934 amendments,
40
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gives a special defense to control
persons, it will often be important
to determine whether one is liable
under §15 or §11(a).
Vicarious Liability
Further, vicarious liability may
be imposed on persons other than
those specified by §§11(a) and 15
by operation of common law rules
of agency or aiding and abetting.
See especially In re Caesar's Palace
Securities Litigation, 360 F. Supp.
366, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (aid-
ing and abetting a §11 violation);
SEC v. Management Dynamics,
Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Bind-
er] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
195,017 (2d Cir. 1975) (SEC
enforcement proceeding, principal
held liable for agent's fraud under
the analogue to §15 and §20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and Rule lOb-5; §20a held
to supplement and not restrict vi-
carious liability.)
There may be some question
whether persons who control dum-
my directors are covered, not by
§15, but by §11(a)(2) and (3),
which imposes the same liability
that directors face upon "persons




Conspicuous by their absence
from §11(a) as potential defend-
ants are security holders in a "con-
trol relationship" with the issuer,
whose offerings may have to be
registered under §5.
Control persons are not exempt-
ed from the registration require-
ments of §5 if they use a §2(11)
statutory underwriter to make a
distribution, as those terms are
defined by the Act and Rule 144.
If the sale is but a "link in a chain
of transactions through which se-
curities move from an issuer to the
public," it must be registered. Pre-
liminary Note to Rule 144. A per-
son is in a "control relationship,"
as defined in the last sentence of
§2(11), if he controls an issuer,
is controlled by an issuer, or is
under common control with the
issuer, as in a brother-sister cor-
poration relationship.
Therefore a person in a "con-
trol relationship" whose shares
must be registered under §5 will
not be subject to §11 liability un-
less he is in that one type of "con-
trol relationship" whereby he is
the one who is in control, because
§11 itself does not list control per-
sons as defendants and §15 in-
cludes only the "controlling per-
son" who controls someone.
ELEMENTS OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
Misrepresentations
and Omissions
Misrepresentations of fact, half-
truths, and omissions of facts re-
quired in the registration state-
ment, if material, are actionable
when contained in or omitted from
41
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the effective registration statement.
However, misrepresentations and
omissions from other documents,
such as the "red herring" prospec-
tus, are not actionable under § 11.
What are "facts" and what are
"material facts" are questions of
no small moment. See Schneider,
Nits, Grits and Soft Information
in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 254 (1972); Kripke, Rule
lOb-5 Liability and "Material"
"Facts," 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1061
(1971). Literal-mindedness as to
what constitutes a fact is not in
consonance with recent decisions,
which have held that estimates of
an insurance company's excess re-
serves are facts, Feit v. Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp.,
332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), as are projections of profits,
Beecher v. Able [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 194,450 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). But see Heller, Disclosure
Requirements Under Federal Se-
curities Regulation, 16 Bus. LAW-
YER 300, 307-08 (1961), protest-
ing that such information is not
"facts."
The common law recognized
that an utterance was actionable
if misleading even though it was
an opinion, and the emphasis was
on "material," not on "fact." While
projections were not facts under
early common law cases, an attor-
ney's opinion of law could be mis-
leading if, under the circumstances,
it was reasonable to rely upon it.
W. PROSSER, TORTS 725 (West
Publishing, St. Paul, 4th ed. 1971).
Accountants still urge in their
pleas for a "better understanding"
of accounting by lawyers that audi-
tors' reports are merely "opinions."




Because §11(a) speaks of mis-
representations and omissions
when the registration statement
became effective, two quite similar
situations receive differing treat-
ment. The draftsmen, apparently
concerned in §11 with maximizing
the possibilities for an honest reg-
istration statement, required only
that it be true when made-i.e.,
when effective.
Thus, representations that were
true when made, but which sub-
sequently become false because
circumstances changed, are neither
actionable under §11 nor require
post-effective amendments to the
registration statement. See I Loss
293.
On the other hand, representa-
tions that were false when made,
although the falsity is not discov-
ered until later, are actionable
under §11, and require "post-
effective" amendments to the reg-
istration statement. See 1 Loss
219.
For other fraud sections of the
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securities acts, both types of cases
are treated as misleading. Fischer
v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Fiflis, Current
Problems of Accountants' Respon-
sibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND.
L. REV. 31, 128-30 (1975). Both
types of cases would seem to in-
voke the doctrine of SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d
1082, 1096-97 (2d Cir. 1972),
which held that a prospectus true
when made, but which later be-
came false, is not a prospectus for
purposes of §5 requiring delivery
of a prospectus on sale of a se-
curity. The case would clearly ap-
ply where the prospectus was false
from the start but the falsity was
discovered belatedly. See Folk,
Civil Liabilities under the Federal
Securities Acts: The Bar Chris
Case (Part II), 5 VA. L. REV 199,
256-266 (1969).
Unfulfilled Projections
Projections frequently appear in
prospectuses. Although projections
were specifically prohibited only in
proxy solicitations under the Note
to Rule 14a-9, the Commission
had a basic policy against any pro-
jections in prospectuses until two
years ago. Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d
Cir. 1973); Thomas Bond, Inc.,
5 S.E.C. 61, 71 (1939); T. FIFLIS
& H. KRIPKE, ACCOUNTING FOR
BUSINESS LAWYERS 472 (West
Publishing, St. Paul, 1971). They
are now permitted but not re-
quired. SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 9844 (Nov. 1,
1972 [1972-1973 Transfer Bind-
er] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,075; Beecher v. Able (1973-
1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 94,450, at p. 95,561
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (by stipulation
of parties). See also the "hot is-
sues" releases and other items
cited in Ruder, Disclosure of Fi-
nancial Projections, FIFTH AN-
NUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 5, 9-10 (Practising
Law Institute, New York City,
1974).
If projections are false when
made because without foundation,
they will result in liability only
when damages occur. Hence, most
often suits probably will not be
brought unless the projections do
not eventuate or some other fac-
tors cause a decline in values. In
the latter event, the "comparative
causation" concept of §11 (e) may
apply. On the other hand, a pro-
jection may not be false even
though it later fails to occur.
One important case involving
projections was a §11 case, only
recently completed at the trial
level. Beecher v. Able [1973-
1974, Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 794,450 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), and [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
f195,016 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In the
first opinion, the Court held that
predictions in a prospectus that
43
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Douglas Aircraft would break even
for a particular year were materi-
ally false because of a failure to
disclose some uncertain assump-
tions underlying the forecast and
the fact that prior projections had
been quite inaccurate. In the sec-
ond opinion, the Court considered
damages under §11(e).
On the other hand, in Dolgow
v. Andersen, 53 F.R.D. 664
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), afl'd, 464 F.2d
437 (2d Cir. 1972), where the
Court held merely that the action
could not proceed as a class action,
it said that an unmet projection
was probably not a misrepresenta-
tion even though the underlying
assumptions were not stated. Per-
haps the cases can be reconciled
on the basis of the reasonableness
of the assumptions under the cir-
cumstances. See generally, Com-
ment, 16 B.C. IND. & COMM. L.
REV. 115 (1974).
Pleading
The pleading of misrepresenta-
tions or omissions under §11 is
not regulated by Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which requires pleading of fraud
with particularity. Schoenfeld v.
Giant Stores Corp., F1973-1974,
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 94,460 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
Materiality
The formal definitions of mate-
riality tend to use synonyms in a
circular way-e.g., a fact is mate-
rial to a reasonable man if an
ordinary person would, or might,
consider it important, or if it is a
matter as to which an average
prudent investor ought reasonably
to be informed before purchasing.
These definitions are not useful
except to begin the inquiry, which
seems to boil down to whether the
trier of fact believes that an in-
vestor justifiably relied.
The determination of the court
is not always convincing. In Escott
v. Bar Chris Construction Co., 283
F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
the Court found a misstatement of
the current ratio at 1.9 to I rather
than 1.6 to 1 to be material, while
an earnings overstatement of 16
per cent was not material where
actual earnings had increased from
$441,103 for 1959 to $1,496,196
for 1960, instead of the misrepre-
sented increase to $1,742,801.
The most interesting treatment
of materiality was in Feit v. Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp.,
332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), where Judge Weinstein
articulated several features of the
concept. Among other things, he
pointed out that materiality in a
formal document such as a pros-
pectus is more readily established
than when the same words are
used informally, and that it dif-
fered with the various antifraud
provisions of the securities acts
and with the nature of the com-
44
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munication as an affirmative state-
ment or omission.
Defendants' Culpability
A plaintiff need not establish
the defendant's knowledge of, or
negligence concerning, the untruth,
or the foreseeability of the harm
or an intent to cause it, although
a defendant other than the issuer
will have certain due diligence
defenses.
Causation
A plaintiff need not show that
the purchase was caused by the
misrepresentation, unless he ac-
quired the security after an earn-
ings statement for a 12 month
period after the effective date of
the registration statement was
made generally available to the
issuer's security holders. Even
then, reliance may be established
without proof of the reading of
the registration statement. §11(a).
The possibility of reliance on an
unread registration statement has
puzzled many. Doubtless, this lan-
guage in §11(a), being one of the
1934 amendments, was the result
of some pushing and shoving by
the antagonists and is not com-
pletely clear. However, one of the
draftsmen explains it by suggesting
that the seller's claims, communi-
cated to the buyer, will be based
on the registration statement. See
letter of James M. Landis to Felix
Frankfurter dated December 4,
1933, quoted extensively in R.
CHATOV, THE COLLAPSE OF COR-
PORATE FINANCIAL STANDARDS
REGULATION: A STUDY OF SEC-
ACCOUNTANT INTERACTION 150
(Ph.D. Dissertation, U. Cal.,
Berkeley, 1973).
Furthermore, reliance by an in-
vestor on the unread untruth could
also be the result of an investment
advisor's recommendations based
on the registration statement, Rud-
nick v. Franchard Corp., 237 F.
Supp. 871, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
as well as reliance on the market
price as being based on legal dis-
closure. Cf. Competitive Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 95,090 (2d Cir.
1975); Reeder v. Mastercraft
Electronics Corp., 363 F. Supp.
574 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
A contract measure of damages
would give a plaintiff the difference
between what he paid and the
value, at that time, of what he
received. Section 11(e), however,
uses a different measure, compli-
cated with variables, resulting in
eight different possible combina-
tions. In addition, it establishes a
special measure for underwriters,
and provides all defendants with
a "comparative causation" defense.
Because of the various combina-
tions, it is impossible to state the
45
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general measure in a simple sen-
tence. The statute uses three
clauses in a compound sentence,
which, when paraphrased, say:
The general measure of damages
for all except underwriters is the
amount paid by the plaintiff, or the
public offering price, whichever is
less, minus:
' The value at the time of suit, if
the securities have not been resold
before judgment;
*The sale price received, if the
securities have been resold in the
market before suit; or
• The higher of value at time of
suit or price received on resale, if
the securities have been resold
after suit but before judgment.
In a recovering market, a plain-
tiff's attorney must be careful to
tell the client that he may recover
less if he resells the security than
if he holds it.
Numerous complex questions
may arise, making the formula
even more difficult. For example,
the "value" even of publicly traded
securities unsold at the time of
suit may not be trading price. Feit
v. Leasco Data Processing Equip-
ment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544
(E.D.N.Y. 1971). Cf. Beecher v.
Able, [1974-1975 Transfer Bind-
er] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
195,016 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). And
what is the value of a security sold
before suit if the sale is a distress
sale rather than "in the market?"
If the defendant is an under-
writer, his liability is further lim-
ited unless he received some spe-
cial benefit from the issuer. The
outside limit for an underwriter is
the total offering price of the
securities underwritten by him and
actually distributed to the public.
This outside limit is based on the
price of the securities sold, not on
the damages incurred, and should
be contrasted with the underwrit-
er's liability under §10b-5. Chris-
Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Air-
craft Corporation, [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 95,058 (2d Cir. 1975).
Regarding the measure of dam-
ages generally, see Cherner v.
Transitron Electronic Corp., 221
F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1963);
Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F.
Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Beecher v. Able, [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 95,016 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
Under the ALI Code, § 1403 (h),
Reporter's Revision of Text of
T.D.'s Nos. 1-3 (1974), there
would be a general $100,000 per
defendant limit of liability for
negligence on all but underwriters
and issuers, except that for de-
fendants whose gross revenues ex-
ceed $10,000,000, the limit is 1
per cent of their gross revenues,
to a maximum of $1,000,000. See
T.D. No. 2 Comment e, p. 106.
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Concomitantly, recovery is to be
prorated among all the potential
claimants. ALI Code §1409.
Comparative Causation
As a result of the 1934 amend-
ments, §11(e) was altered to per-
mit a defendant to prove that any
portion of the damages did not
result from the untruths in the part
of the registration statement upon
which his liability is asserted.
The opponents of this amend-
ment probably comforted them-
selves with the thought that, as a
practical matter, it could never be
effectively invoked. That was the
view held by two able commenta-
tors. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES
AND MATERIALS 810 (Foundation
Press, Mineola, N.Y., 2d ed.
1968). But Feit vs. Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp., 332
F. Supp. 544, 586-587 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), has given the words a
powerful effect.
In that decision, Judge Wein-
stein reasoned that the share values
would have declined proportion-
ately to the Standard & Poor's
Daily Stock Price Index, and he
therefore diminished the measure
of damages in the same proportion.
In Beecher v. Able [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 95,016, at p. 97,560
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), Judge Motley
endorsed the Leasco technique but
found that the defendants there
had failed in their burden of proof,
offering numerous items of evi-
dence to show that the security's
value probably would not have
dropped. However, even in this
case, the plaintiffs had made a
concession based on the concept of
§11(e).
The ALI Code has adopted this
proviso for all kinds of cases, not
limiting it to §11 type situations.
The comments refer to the concept
as "comparative causation." See
§1402(f)(2)(A) and comments
thereto in T.D. No. 2 (1973).
Rescission
The 1934 amendments intro-
duced some enigmatic language
concerning the relief available to
the plaintiff.
The words of §11 (a) permitting
suits "at law or in equity" and of
§11(e) that the suits authorized
under §11(a) "may be to recover
such damages" leave open the
question whether the plaintiff is
limited exclusively to the defined
damage liability of §11(e) or
whether he may obtain equitable
relief such as rescission.
In certain circumstances, rescis-
sion may be more favorable to a
plaintiff than damages and may
invoke equity practices and pro-
cedures not otherwise applicable.
Still, the infirmities of a common
law rescission action, described in
Shulman, Civil Liability and the
Securities Act, 43 YALE L. J. 227,
47
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231-33 (1933), would perhaps be
applicable to an action for rescis-
sion based on §11.
A consideration of the history
of the 1934 amendments repealing,
inter alia, an express rescission
remedy, is relevant. Section 11 (e)
had originally read: "The suit
authorized under subsection (a)
may be either (1) to recover the
consideration paid for such secur-
ity with interest thereon, less the
amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such
security or (2) for damages if the
person suing no longer owns the
security."
Section 12(2), which now reads
as the original §11(e) had read,
allows, according to Independence
Shares Corporation v. Deckert, 108
F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939), an action
merely for money damages and
not for equitable relief. But the
Supreme Court, reversing in Deck-
ert v. Independence Shares Corp.,
311 U.S. 282, 287-88 (1940),
held that although the ultimate re-
covery under §12(2) must be
limited to what is permitted there-
under, the form of action or the
procedure employed may include
a claim for equitable relief under
the "Act as a whole" and §22(a),
which permits enforcement in
equity or law of all liabilities under
the Act.
Both of the same grounds apply
equally under §11(e) as it now
reads. Furthermore, the plaintiff
should be able to add a count un-
der §12(2) and seek rescission or
other equitable relief, following the
Supreme Court's decision in Deck-
ert. I. 1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964), and Mills v. The
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375 (1970), further strengthen
this view. But see Gerity v. Cable
Funding Corp. [1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,205, at n.4, p. 94,874 (D. Del.
1973), where the court left unre-
solved the question whether liqui-
dation and dissolution could be
decreed under §11.
Under the original act, "rescis-
sion" presumably could be had
against all the defendants. Rescis-
sion under the amended act might
seem to be available only against
the petitioner's immediate seller-
perhaps an underwriter or dealer.
But see the recent case allowing
rescission against a non-seller un-
der Rule 10b-5. Gordon v. Burr,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder]




The only substantive defense of
the issuer under §11 is that the
plaintiff knew of the untruth or
omission at the time of his acqui-
sition. Of course, any defendant
will seek to refute the affirmative
elements of the plaintiff's case or
to introduce facts that require the
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plaintiff to go forward with evi-
dence. Thus, the issuer may show
that it had issued a 12 month earn-
ing statement and force the plain-
tiff to prove reliance on the mis-
leading facts in the registration
statement.
Furthermore, the comparative
causation defense of §11(e) may
be established by the issuer. Per-
haps if rescission or other equitable
relief is applicable, equity doctrines
of laches and unclean hands will
also be available, although there
are no cases on these matters.
The issuer has no "due dili-
gence" defense of the type avail-
able to all other defendants.
Non-experts
In addition to the defenses and
opportunities to shift the burden
of going forward available to the
issuer, all other defendants have
certain additional defenses under
§I1(b).
Withdrawal
Any defendant may prove that
he withdrew from the office and
relationship described in the regis-
tration statement, and notified the
Commission and the issuer in
writing before the effective date.
§11(b) (1).
Due Diligence
Of more significance are the due
diligence defenses of §11(b)(3).
Although non-experts are respon-
sible for the entire registration
statement, their duties of diligence
are diminished for the expertised
portions, and need merely negative
belief and any reasonable ground
for believing the statements in the
expertised parts were untrue.
§11(b) (3) (C).
As to the remainder of the reg-
istration statement, they have a
duty to investigate the facts to
establish an affirmative belief and
reason to believe in the truthful-
ness of the statements. §11(b)
(3)(A). The standard of reason-
ableness is that of the "prudent
man in the management of his own
property." §11(c).
The facts that will establish
these defenses and the right to




Experts are responsible only for
the expertised portions. §11(a).
They have a duty to investigate
the facts to establish an affirmative
belief and reason to believe in the
truthfulness of these portions.
§11(b) (3)(B).
Somewhat incongruously, the
same standard of reasonableness-
that of "a prudent man in the
management of his own property"
-applies to experts and non-ex-
perts. Does this mean that an
auditor must audit as though he
were working for himself? Prob-
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ably not. See the Bar Chris opinion
requiring auditors to follow the
standards of their profession. But
the statutory language arguably
may permit a court to hold an
expert to a higher standard than
that of his profession when the
custom is not supported by learned
reason. See Fiflis, Current Prob-
lems of Accountants' Responsibili-
ties to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L.
REV. 31, 83 (1975).
An expert is any accountant,
engineer, appraiser, or person
whose profession gives authority
to a statement made by him.
§11 (a) (4).
An expertised portion of a reg-
istration statement is any part of
the registration statement which
was prepared or certified or which
is copied from or extracted from
a report or valuation which was
prepared or certified by an expert
whose name is mentioned with his
consent.
Because of the holding in Bar
Chris, supra, it has generally been
assumed that an accountant is an
expert only with respect to audited
statements. While that is, at least
in part, a factual question, under
the typical existing practices, ad-
mittedly only the audited state-
ments are expertised.
Because what is "expertised" is
a question of fact to some extent,
the diligence duty of non-experts
is not as strong for the expertised
portions, and experts are liable
only with respect to their exper-
tised portions, there may be a con-
flict of interest between experts
who would seek to minimize the
extent of expertised portions and
the non-experts who would want
to maximize it. An attorney should
be careful to note the conflict
when the registration statement is
being prepared.
Withdrawal
An expert has the same defense
of withdrawal and notification as a
non-expert.
Controlling Persons
Controlling persons who are li-
able vicariously would seem to
have the benefits of defenses es-
tablished by their subordinates,
although this is not entirely clear.
They have a further defense under
§ 15 if they show they "had no
knowledge of or reasonable
grounds to believe in the existence
of the facts by reason of which the
liability of the controlled person is
alleged to exist."
Does this clause require the
controlling person to make an in-
vestigation? Does it merely mean
that if he knows of suspicious cir-
cumstances he must inquire fur-
ther? Is mere absence of evidence
of falsity a defense? Will his duty
be higher when the sale is his own
secondary offering? Does he have
a duty to supervise the controlled
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person so as to become aware of
facts which would have put him
on notice? Will the duty vary as
the persons controlled vary from
the issuer to underwriter to ac-
counting firm? See Folk, Civil Lia-
bilities under the Federal Securities
Acts: The Bar Chris Case (Part
II), 5 VA. L. REV. 199, 218-223
(1969).
MULTIPLE PARTY LIABILITY
The liability of all the defend-
ants, with the possible exception
of controlling persons, is joint and
several. §11(f). Thus, a plaintiff
need not sue all the potential de-
dendants, and, for example, if the
issuer is solvent, he may consider
suing only the issuer to avoid es-
tablishing an array of defense
attorneys against him and because
the issuer has no due diligence
defense.
Whenever more than one person
is liable, problems of contribution
and indemnification arise. The
problems are exacerbated under
the securities laws for several
reasons:
* Section 11 (f) and other sections
provide express rights of contribu-
tion, thereby altering the normal
common law rules concerning con-
tribution among joint tortfeasors;
* Often contracts for indemnity
are in existence, especially between
issuers and underwriters and issu-
ers and their officers and directors;
* Each of the defendants is likely
to have varying degrees of rela-
tionship to the wrong, with the
result that those less closely re-
lated will believe they should not
bear the ultimate loss;
0 At times the parties may have
been misled one by the other, thus
invoking many calls for indemni-
fication; and
* Huge sums are often at stake,
making the pressure to seek indem-
nity or contribution great.
As a result, attorneys involved
in securities litigation face difficult
problems in this area in virtually
every case.
Since §11(f) permits contribu-
tion "as in cases of contract," it
has been said that contribution
should be pro rata without regard
to fault, though it should not
be available on behalf of or against
controlling persons liable under
§15, and experts may not be en-
titled to contribution against non-
experts who establish their own
diligence as to expertised portions.
Douglas & Bates, The Federal Se-
curities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.
J. 171, 179, 196 (1933). But see
Gould v. American-Hawaiian SS
Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 169-72
(D. Del. 1974).
Some other specific problems
under §11(f) seem worth raising:
0 Given the express grant of a
contribution right, is indemnity to
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be denied? In a case under Rule
lOb-5, but following §11(f) by
analogy, contribution was allowed
and indemnity denied, at least
where both parties were guilty of
the fraud. Globus v. Law Research
Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d
Cir. 1969) (indemnity denied);
318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (contribution permitted on
remand). Indemnification would
seem to work contrary to the pol-
icy of the Act to deter misrepre-
sentation.
* Since most issuers are corpora-
tions that can perpetrate acts only
through directors and officers,
should a corporation be entitled to
indemnity from its directors and
other servant-agents liable under
§11? See the analogy in deHaay
v. Empire Petroleum Company,
286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo.
1968).
0 Section 11(f) specifies that if
the first person held "liable was,
and the other was not, guilty of
fraudulent misrepresentation,"
there should be no contribution.
Aside from the difficulties suggest-
ed in this language in the case of
corporations that are issuers, and
the problems of defining terms,
what if the only person initially
sued was guilty of mere neglect
and another is guilty of fraudulent
misrepresentation? Will this for-
tuitous order of events mean that
the first person held is stuck with
part of the liability or should the
fact that had he not been sued by
the victim he would have no li-
ability to make contribution en-
title him to sue for full indemnity?
0 If a plaintiff sues only the issuer,
will the issuer have a duty to seek
contribution or indemnification? If
the same persons are directors
when the liability arose and when
the issuer pays the judgment, they
would have a conflict of interest.
See the SEC brief in opposition to
corporate issuer's petition to allow
it to pay the full liability in Feit
v. Leasco, F1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
f93,415.
0 If the terms of a settlement
whereby the issuer pays more than
its share of the liability are not
disclosed, is this a failure to dis-
close a material fact in connection
with a purchase or sale of a se-
curity so as to be actionable under
§10b-5? Perhaps disclosure itself
will not avoid the application of
§10b-5 under one aspect of Scho-
enbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
* If a partial settlement is made,
say, with one of two defendants,
what will be the liability of the
settling defendant to contribute to
the non-settling defendant?
* What is the applicable statute
of limitations for a contribution
action under § 1 (f) or for contri-
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bution or indemnification actions
otherwise? When is it initiated and
tolled?
0 For § 11 (f) contribution actions,
the broad venue and service pro-
visions of §22(a) will apply, but
what of actions for contribution or
indemnification otherwise? See
Miller v. Hano, 8 F.R.D. 67, 71
(E.D. Pa. 1947), holding that no
independent basis of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction is required. The
venue would seem to be appropri-
ately identical to venue for the
main action. Lyons v. Marrud,
Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Bind-
er] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
[92,307 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). But
jurisdiction over the person is a
different matter, and must be in-
dependently established. U.S. v.
Rhoades, 14 F.R.D. 373 (D. Colo.
1953) (involving the Housing and
Rent Act of 1947). See 3 Loss
1739 and 6 Loss 3855 for further
treatment.
Many of these questions have
been addressed at least in part in
several decisions. Many more
cases will be required before clear
rules can emerge.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Statute of Limitations, §13
of the Act, will cause the action
to expire one year after discovery
of the misrepresentation or omis-
sion should have been made and
not later than three years after a
bona fide offer to the public.
The plaintiff must plead and
prove the non-expiration of the
limitations period, in accordance
with the usual federal rule for
periods of limitation that are part
of the substantive cause of action.
Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d 818
(3d Cir. 1941).
JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND SERVICE
Under §22 of the Act, jurisdic-
tion is concurrent with state and
territorial courts and removal is
prohibited.
Venue is placed "in the district
wherein the defendant is found or
is an inhabitant or transacts busi-
ness, or in the district where the
offer or sale took place, if the de-
fendant participated therein."
Process may be served in the
district of venue, any other district
in which the defendant is an in-
habitant, or wherever the defendant
may be found.
SECURITY FOR COSTS
Under §I1(e), a court may re-
quire security for costs, including
attorney's fees, from any party
under any section of the 1933 Act,
and if the suit or defense is found
to be without merit, it may tax
costs after judgment. §11(e) was
intended to avert strike suits.
The court's determination is
generally not appealable. Donlon
Industries, Inc. v. Forte, 402 F.2d
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935 (2d Cir. 1968). See Klein v.
Adams & Peck, 436 F.2d 337 (2d
Cir. 1971) (not appealable since
not a final order, and claims of
abuse of discretion are so unlikely




Section 11 may not exhaust the
possibilities of recovery for mis-
representations and omissions in
securities sales. See Stewart v. Ben-
nett, 359 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass.
1973), for a summary of the vary-
ing views. But see Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 95
S. Ct. 1917, 1933, at n.15 (1975),
which may renew the enthusiasm
of defense attorneys to argue
against the availability of other
provisions.
As previously noted, in the
Second Circuit, a misleading pros-
pectus is no prospectus at all for
the purpose of meeting the re-
quirement of delivery of a prospec-
tus on sale of a security. SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458
F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972). Since
§12(1) gives a private action for
non-delivery of a prospectus, it
may be that a plaintiff could ob-
tain rescission or damages under
§12(1) for a misleading prospec-
tus.
Much of the law of §11 may
have substantial effects on analo-
gous requirements of diligence and
rights of contribution under other
sections. See deHaas v. Empire
Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809
(D. Colo. 1968); Globus v. Law
Research Service, Inc., 318 F.
Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); and
especially Folk, Civil Liabilities
under the Federal Securities Acts:
The Bar Chris Case (Part 11), 5
VA. L. REV. 199 (1969).
This overlap is one of the prin-
cipal targets of the ALI Code
project. Avoiding overlaps is gen-
erally commendable as a matter
of neatness. But given the present
availability of numerous remedies
for misleading prospectuses, in
weighing the fairness of the ALI
Code, one cannot merely compare
§11 with proposed §1403. It is
necessary to also consider the ef-
fect of removal of present rights
of action under the other fraud
provisions of the Act.
CONCLUSION
Close analysis of §11 yields a
surprising quantity of difficult
questions under this most explicit
of the securities acts' civil liability
provisions. One must anticipate
that the newly perceived potency
of the section will yield a greatly
increased flow of decisions in the
near future. In the meantime, prac-
titioners would be well-advised to
take a second look at what at first
glance may seem to be a simple
provision imposing civil liability
for misleading registration state-
ments.
